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To date, society is becoming increasingly networked and connected (van Dijk, 2012). As 
more services to customers are offered online, such as banking, government and health, 
security becomes increasingly important. Harm can be done to individuals, the economy and 
society when security is compromised, for example, by means of data breaches and 
distributed denial%of%service attacks. As stated in the Netherlands’ first National 
Cybersecurity Strategy, (secure) IT is fundamental for our prosperity and well%being and 
essential for economic growth. This means that besides increasing the adoption and use of IT, 
it is equally important to ensure its safety and security (Dutch Ministry of Security and 
Justice, 2011). It is evident that societal issues like cybersecurity need to be addressed by 
different parties, such as Internet service providers, telecom organizations and governmental 
agencies. However, it is equally important that end%users behave in a secure fashion, as they 
play an essential role in safeguarding the online domain. Moreover, they are essential for 
achieving online security (Furnell  2006; Liang and Xue, 2010; Ng  2009). 
The present study deals with safety and security of online banking from an end%user 
perspective. Online banking is a means by which customers can access different kinds of 
banking services via the Internet. By 2015, 85% of Dutch citizens aged 16 and over had 
adopted this service (Eurostat, 2016). However, as the Internet also attracts criminals (Bossler 
and Holt, 2009; van Wilsem, 2011), online banking is not without risk. End%users are, for 
example, confronted with phishing and malware attacks (Jansen and Leukfeldt, 2015), 
techniques fraudsters use to obtain user%credentials in order to steal money from their bank 
accounts. Because banks cannot control their customers’ behaviour or the devices their 
customers use, it is important that end%users are aware of threats aimed at online banking and 
are able to prevent threats from manifesting in harm (Furnell and Clarke, 2012; Jansen, 2015). 
A challenge here is that although end%users are ultimately responsible for their own online 
behaviour and the security of their devices, they often have insufficient knowledge or lack the 
tendency to protect themselves (Furnell  2008) and are also not adequately aware of the 
online threats they are faced with (Kritzinger and von Solms, 2010). 
Furthermore, an international phenomenon regarding online banking is a shift in 
responsibility towards the end%user (Anderson, 2007; Davinson and Sillence, 2014). On the 
one hand, this is not surprising because the safety and security of online banking cannot only 
be addressed by banks. However, there is some debate on how far user%responsibility should 
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go, as online banking is a service that is pushed towards bank customers. It is not a voluntary 
choice in the sense that as traditional banking services are made more expensive and less 
accessible, for example by closing local bank offices. Ultimately, a combination of technical, 
human, but also legal aspects is required to ensure a safe online environment. To that extent, 
end%users thus also have responsibilities regarding the safety and security of online banking. 
In this paper, we study what motivates end%users to protect themselves against online threats 
by analysing three social cognitive models. A better understanding of precautionary online 
behaviour is required to enhance safety and security from an end%user perspective. 
The current study evaluates three models in terms of their effectiveness in explaining 
precautionary online behaviour. We compare protection motivation theory (PMT) (Maddux 
and Rogers, 1983; Rogers, 1975), the reasoned action approach (RAA) (Fishbein and Ajzen, 
2010) and an integrated model which comprises PMT and RAA variables. PMT and RAA 
seem equally valuable in the present context and are discussed in more detail in Section 2. By 
testing individual and integrated models we make two contributions: first, theoretical 
knowledge is advanced and, second, maximum effectiveness is pursued (Lippke and 
Ziegelmann, 2008; Sommestad  2015). In addition, based upon Ifinedo’s (2012) work, 
we expect the integrated model to provide a more comprehensive account of the determinants 
of precautionary online behaviour. Our main interest is aimed at explained variance rather 
than assessing the quality of the models (see for example Prochaska  [2008]). 
Both PMT and RAA (including RAA’s predecessors), have been tested extensively to 
predict numerous behavioural intentions and actual behaviours. However, to our knowledge 
they have not been widely compared in the information security domain, nor have they been 
extensively tested in an integrated fashion. Comparison is needed to help researchers make 
informed decisions about the usefulness of social cognitive models in this area. Therefore, the 
aim of our study is to evaluate the usefulness of PMT and RAA in explaining precautionary 
online behaviour. In addition, our study advances the understanding of precautionary online 
behaviour, which is still limited (Anderson and Agarwal, 2010; Liang and Xue, 2010; Ng 
 2009). The results are useful for scholars and practitioners who want to study and improve 
online safety and security practices by end%users in general, and safe and secure online 
banking in particular.
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In this section, first an overview is presented of PMT (Section 2.1) and RAA (Section 2.2), 
complemented with definitions of the predictor variables and a set of hypotheses that are 
tested in this study. This is followed by a discussion of precautionary online behavioural 
intention, the target behaviour of our study (Section 2.3). 
 
	

To date, several models exist that try to explain and predict behaviour (Floyd  2000). In 
the information systems domain, extensive research is done on the adoption of technology. 
Examples of adoption theories include the technology acceptance model (Davis, 1989) and 
the unified theory of acceptance and use of technology (Venkatesh  2003). However, 
most of these studies focus on , of which online banking can be 
considered an example. 
, which focus on preventing negative 
outcomes, are an under%studied subject in this area (Chenoweth  2009). Moreover, 
studies on precautionary online behaviour and on how such behaviour can be changed are 
scarce (Ng  2009). Because research has shown that significant difference exists 
between beneficial and protective technologies (Dinev and Hu, 2005), it seems that other 
theories than adoption theories might be more appropriate. 
We believe that PMT provides an appropriate theoretical background for the current 
study. First, the theory has been successfully applied to understand and predict the use of 
numerous protective measures (Milne  2000). Second, PMT has evolved over time 
towards a powerful explanatory theory for precautionary behaviour (Floyd  2000). 
Third, PMT includes the concept of risk, which is absent in adoption theories (Johnston and 
Warkentin, 2010). Another important argument in favour of PMT, or its variants (e.g. threat 
control model [Workman  2008], technology threat avoidance theory [Liang and Xue, 
2009] and fear appeals model [Johnston and Warkentin, 2010]), is that they have recently 
been applied to the information security domain (Boss  2015; Vance  2012). These 
studies have shown that PMT provides a useful framework for predicting precautionary online 
behaviour. This has been demonstrated for both home computer users (Anderson and 
Agarwal, 2010; Chenoweth  2009; Crossler, 2010; Johnston and Warkentin, 2010; Lai 
 2012; Liang and Xue, 2010) and end%users who operate within an organizational context 
(Herath and Rao, 2009; Ifinedo, 2012; Lee, 2011; Lee and Larsen, 2009; Pahnila  2007; 
Vance  2012; Workman  2008, 2009). We also considered an alternative, yet 
similar theory: the health belief model (HBM) (Rosenstock  1988). This has previously 
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also been applied to information security issues (Davinson and Sillence, 2010; Ng  
2009). A primary difference between HBM and PMT is that HBM consists of a set of 
variables that have an effect on behaviour, while PMT arranges its predictor variables in 
cognitive processes that individuals apply in order to evaluate threats and coping measures 
(Prentice%Dunn and Rogers, 1986; Weinstein, 1993). We therefore believe that the variables 
and processes included in PMT makes this theory more suitable for improving our 
understanding of precautionary online behaviour than HBM. Finally, PMT is useful for 
developing interventions (Floyd  2000), as it is viewed as a framework to develop and 
evaluate persuasive communications (Norman  2005). 
According to PMT, end%users are motivated to protect themselves based on threat 
appraisal and coping appraisal processes, which implies that end%users first evaluate possible 
threats and then possible coping strategies. These evaluations determine users’ protection 
motivation, in other words their intention to proceed, continue or avoid a given behaviour 
(Floyd  2000). “Protection motivation is an intervening variable that has the typical 
characteristics of a motive: it arouses, sustains, and directs activity” (Rogers 1975, p. 98). 
Depending on the level of protection motivation aroused, end%users will adopt an adaptive or 
maladaptive coping response. The former means that end%users actually follow the 
recommended response, in this case taking precautions. The latter holds that end%users do not 
follow the recommended response, thereby potentially exposing themselves increasingly to 
online threats. 
In PMT, the threat appraisal process consists of perceived vulnerability and perceived 
severity. Crossler (2010) describes perceived vulnerability as the personal probability or 
likelihood of a security incident occurring and perceived severity as the impact of 
consequences resulting from a security incident. The rewards%construct is also part of PMT’s 
threat appraisal process, but is often omitted (Milne  2000) – also in our study – because 
the theoretical difference between a reward associated with not following the coping response 
and a response cost (part of the coping appraisal process) is in doubt (Abraham  1994).
Threat appraisal is a unique component in PMT, not present in RAA. Based on the notions 
above, 
 
 perceived vulnerability positively influences precautionary online behavioural intention; 
 perceived severity positively influences precautionary online behavioural intention. 
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The coping appraisal process includes an evaluation of the estimated coping strategies to 
avoid or minimize a threat. This process consists of response efficacy, self%efficacy and 
response costs. Milne  (2000) describe the first construct as the perceived effectiveness 
of a response in reducing a threat, the second as users’ belief whether they are able to perform 
the recommended response and the third as how costly performing the response will be to the 
user. Notably, we use a domain%specific interpretation of self%efficacy as proposed by Rhee 
 (2009, p. 818) who term this ‘self%efficacy in information security’: “a belief in one’s 
capability to protect information and information systems from unauthorized disclosure, 
modification, loss, destruction, and lack of availability”. Hence, 
 
  response efficacy positively influences precautionary online behavioural intention; 
! self%efficacy positively influences precautionary online behavioural intention; 
" response costs negatively influence precautionary online behavioural intention. 
 

Although specific theories are preferred when studying specific behaviour, more general 
theories for predicting human behaviour may contain variables that are important within the 
context that is being investigated. One such theory is RAA, which evolved from the popular 
theory of reasoned action (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975) and the theory of planned behaviour 
(Ajzen, 1991). The essence of Fishbein and Ajzen’s (2010) framework is that attitude towards 
behaviour, perceived norms and perceived behavioural control determine users’ intention to 
perform a given behaviour. It is assumed that behavioural intention predicts actual behaviour. 
Moreover, they believe that their approach is unified, accounting for any behaviour. 
Therefore, their approach should also be appropriate for information security behaviour. 
Attitude reflects a user’s positive or negative feelings towards performing the target 
behaviour (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975). A positive attitude towards certain behaviour is 
considered to positively influence that behaviour. An additional rationale for adopting this 
construct is that its relation with intentional behaviour is extensively tested and corroborated 
(Venkatesh  2003). Based on these notions, 
 
# a positive attitude positively influences precautionary online behavioural intention. 
 
Perceived norms, unique in RAA compared to PMT, refer to perceived social pressure and are 
made up of injunctive norms – perceptions what should or ought to be done – and descriptive 
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norms – perceptions that others are or are not performing the target behaviour (Fishbein and 
Ajzen, 2010). According to Anderson and Agarwal (2010) there has been a lack of attention 
to social variables in information systems research, while these variables are considered 
important for users’ behaviour. Consequently, 
 
$ injunctive norms positively influence precautionary online behavioural intention; 
% descriptive norms positively influence precautionary online behavioural intention. 
 
Fishbein and Ajzen (2010) describe perceived behavioural control as perceptions about being 
capable of or having control over the target behaviour. Perceived behavioural control is 
viewed as a combination of self%efficacy (also found in PMT, H4) and locus of control 
(Workman  2008). Rather than selecting the single construct of perceived behavioural 
control, we have chosen to adopt these two constructs because they are distinct (Bandura, 
1977). Locus of control is either internal or external (Rotter, 1966; Workman  2008). 
End%users who have a high level of internal locus of control believe that they are in control of 
the outcomes of a certain event. In this context, internal locus of control can translate into 
proactive behaviour by end%users, taking responsibility for their online safety. End%users who 
are characterized by external locus of control believe that the outcome is controlled powerful 
others or by fate. This could translate into reactive behaviour, leaving responsibility to others, 
expectedly their bank. Consequently, 
 
& internal locus of control positively influences precautionary online behavioural intention. 
 


The recommended responses that banks want their customers to take are found in the so%
called uniform safety rules for online banking. These rules are defined in the general terms 
and conditions of all banks in the Netherlands and are in effect as of January 1 2014. The 
items of the outcome variable of this study are based on these rules. The five rules for safe 
online banking comprise: (a) keep your security codes secret, (b) make sure that your debit 
card is not used by others, (c) secure the devices you use for online banking properly, (d) 
check your bank account regularly and (e) report incidents directly to your bank. In summary, 
precautionary online behaviour includes both technical and non%technical measures against 
security threats. 
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The dependent variable thus consists of items that refer to multiple actions. Although 
this approach is sometimes criticized (Blythe  2015), because predictor variables might 
influence protection motivation for one behaviour, but not for another, others (Crossler and 
Bélanger, 2014) defend this approach, stating that precautionary behaviour against online 
threats constitutes taking multiple actions. Based on this notion and practical considerations 
(lack of validated scales for precautionary online behaviour and length of questionnaire), we 
chose to ask participants questions about their intentions to adhere to the uniform safety rules, 
as intentions are acknowledged to be the most immediate predictor of actual behaviour 
(Fishbein and Ajzen, 2010). Moreover, we followed the work of others in constructing the 
dependent variable, who also measured intentions that signified various actions (Anderson 
and Agarwal, 2010; Herath and Rao, 2009; Ifinedo, 2012). In conclusion, we justify our 
approach with our aim to gain insight into the safety and security intentions of end%users, 
based on the totality of rules presented to them by Dutch banks. 
 
 
'

In this section, we describe the methods used to test the hypotheses and evaluate which model 
is most effective in predicting users’ motivation for precautionary online behaviour. First, we 
discuss the survey questionnaire and procedure (Section 3.1). Second, we provide details on 
the survey participants (Section 3.2). We then discuss data analysis, validity and reliability of 
measures (Section 3.3). 
 
	
Based on literature study, using international databases ACM Digital Library, ScienceDirect 
and Web of Science, we developed a questionnaire. We based the questionnaire items on the 
work of Anderson and Agarwal (2010), Herath and Rao (2009), Ifinedo (2012), Ng  
(2009), Witte (1996) and Workman (2008). The items used a 5%point Likert%scale 
(ranging from totally disagree to totally agree), were translated in Dutch, were programmed in 
LimeSurvey (an open%source online survey tool) and were presented in random order. All 
predictor variables were measured by three items and precautionary online behaviour was 
measured by four items. Two examples of the items adopted: ‘the uniform safety rules help in 
preventing online banking fraud’ (RE1) and ‘it is my intention to comply with the uniform 
safety rules’ (PM4). The full questionnaire is available on request from the corresponding 
author. Before the participants were presented with these items, the uniform safety rules were 
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explicitly defined, to ensure that participants have a common understanding of these rules as 
much as possible. 
A draft version and an interactive online version of the questionnaire were pretested 
qualitatively by 12 individuals, from the target population, major figures from the banking 
sector and academic peers. Based on the results of pre%testing, some minor revisions – such as 
clarifying instructions and specifying terms and concepts – were made to the questionnaire. 
The interactive online version was also pre%tested quantitatively by 34 students. Some 
adjustments needed to be made regarding the wording of the items, since three scales showed 
low reliability (self%efficacy, response costs and locus of control). For the main study, 
participants were recruited by an external recruitment service of online survey panels. The 
questionnaire was online in May%June 2015. 
 

In total, 1200 Dutch users of online banking services completely filled out the online 
questionnaire. Participants’ age ranged from 18 to 85 years (M = 49, SD = 14.5) and the 
gender distribution was 55% female and 45% male. Participants had completed at most lower 
secondary education (15%), upper secondary education (32%) or higher education (53%) and 
were employed (54%), self%employed (7%), retired (19%) or had a different work status 
(20%), such as student and unemployed. 
They were experienced Internet users as more than halve of the participants indicated 
to make use of it over 15 years (53%) and about a third between 11%15 years (30%). One in 25 
indicated to use the Internet 5 years or less (4%) and one in eight 6%10 years (13%). Besides 
online banking, they used the Internet for various purposes, most notably for e%mail (98%), 
searching for information (90%), buying products or services (80%), reading news (79%) and 
social networking (66%). The majority of participants were frequently on line, that is more 
than 20 hours a week (39%) and between 10%20 hours a week (29%). About one in ten was 
less than 3 hours on line per week (9%) and about a quarter between 3%10 hours (24%). 
Participants were reasonably experienced users of online banking services. The largest 
group had 6%10 years of experience with online banking (44%). About a third was more 
experienced, that is 11%15 years (22%) and over 15 years (12%). Just below 1% had less than 
a year’s experience with online banking and 22% 1%5 years. Online banking is frequently used 
to check the account balance. About a quarter of participants did this on a daily basis (24%) 
and over a third on a weekly basis (38%). The remaining participants did this once every two 
weeks (18%), once a month (12%) and less than once a month (8%). Making payments via 
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online banking was done less frequently. Most participants did this once every week (30%) or 
every two weeks (35%). The remainder of the participants reported doing this daily (4%), 
monthly (23%) or less than once a month (8%). 
 

Partial%least%squares path%modelling (PLS), using SmartPLS 2.0 (Ringle  2005), was 
used for data analysis. PLS can be described as a class of multivariate techniques to study 
relationships between measured variables and latent variables and relationships between latent 
variables (Hair  2014). PLS is compatible with multiple regression analysis, analysis of 
variance and unrelated %tests, the results of which are special cases of the results of PLS, but 
which do not account for measurement error, while PLS does. As recommended by Henseler 
(2009), we used a standard bootstrapping procedure (N = 5000) to test the significance 
of the model parameters. 
Component loadings of the individual items, except one item of response costs (RC3) 
which was subsequently deleted, loaded highly (≥ .70) on the corresponding component, 
providing evidence for uni%dimensionality of the items. However, we had to remove two self%
efficacy (SE1 and SE3) and attitude (AT2 and AT3) items, because these items loaded high 
on protection motivation as well (see Appendix, Table A1). Therefore, both constructs were 
represented by only one item in the structural models, posing a potential threat to reliability. 
We chose to retain these constructs since these are important components in PMT and RAA 
respectively. Construct reliability was assessed using the composite reliability co%efficient; for 
all items, the cut%off point of .70 was exceeded (see Appendix, Table A2). 
Convergent validity was assessed using the average variance extracted (AVE) by a 
construct from its indicators, which all, except for locus of control (.65), exceeded the cut%off 
point of .70. However, we chose to retain this construct as more variability in the items of 
locus of control was accounted for by its component than was not. Discriminant validity was 
assessed by analysing the square root of AVE by each construct from its indicators, which 
should be greater than its correlation with the remaining constructs (Fornell%Larcker%
criterion). All values met this condition (see Appendix, Table A3). Additional SPSS analyses 
showed a lack of multicollinearity. 
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The structural models with test results are presented in Figures 1%3. We evaluate the 
significance of the model predictors of precautionary online behaviour.
1
 
 
__________ Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here. __________ 
 
64% of variance in precautionary online behaviour was explained by PMT’s predictors 
perceived vulnerability, perceived severity, response efficacy, self%efficacy and response costs 
(Figure 1). The strongest positive predictor was response efficacy, followed by self%efficacy 
and perceived severity and the negative predictor response costs. Perceived vulnerability had 
no significant effect on precautionary online behaviour. 
 63% of variance in precautionary online behaviour was explained by RAA’s 
predictors attitude, injunctive norms, descriptive norms, self%efficacy and locus of control 
(Figure 2). The strongest positive predictor was attitude, followed by self%efficacy, locus of 
control (internal) and descriptive norms. Injunctive norms had no significant effect on 
precautionary online behaviour. 
 In addition to evaluating the explained variance of both structural model, we also 
calculated the effect size. According to Hair  (2014), this provides information on how 
substantive the impact is of both models. In terms of the effect size 
2
, the additional variance 
explained by PMT over and above RAA (
2
 = .16) and the additional variance explained by 
RAA over and above PMT (
2
 = .13) both represent approximately a medium effect (
2
 = .15; 
Hair  [2014]). 
 
__________ Insert Figure 3 about here. __________ 
 
In the integrated model, explained variance of 68% is highest (Figure 3). The PMT variables 
perceived severity, response efficacy and response costs, the RAA variables attitude, 
descriptive norms and locus of control, and self%efficacy from both models were significant 
predictors of precautionary online behaviour (see Figures 1%3). Therefore, all hypotheses are 
accepted, except for H1 and H7 – thus perceived vulnerability and injunctive norms were not 
significant predictors. 
 
                                                            
1
 The asterisks indicate a significance level of .001 and  stands for not significant. 
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Our study has some limitations. First, the attitude construct contained one item only for 
hypotheses%testing, which potentially threats reliability. Only three items were included in the 
questionnaire to measure this rather complex construct. Although the scale itself was reliable, 
two items loaded too heavily on protection motivation. Future research could make use of a 
more robust measure of attitude, since its explanatory power is often shown (Ifinedo, 2012, 
2014; Venkatesh  2003). However, Herath and Rao (2009) found no significant 
relationship between attitude and security policy compliance. They attributed this result to 
factors such as context, sample and other extraneous factors. Furthermore, they argue that the 
predictive power of attitude might be reduced by the inclusion of other constructs, such as 
self%efficacy and norms. Hence, the precise effect of attitude in this regard is an interesting 
topic for future research. 
 A second limitation can be attributed towards the self%efficacy construct, which was 
represented by one item for hypotheses%testing as well, also possibly threatening reliability. 
Similar to the attitude scale, the self%efficacy scale itself was reliable, but again two items 
loaded too heavily on protection motivation. Future research needs to address this limitation 
using a more robust measure. Specifically, multiple%item measures lead towards higher 
predictive validity (Hair  2014), which c uld mean that self%efficacy is even a stronger 
predictor than it already is. 
Third, we relied on self%reported behavioural intention, which could be considered a 
limitation. Therefore, we recommend observing actual behaviour in future studies, 
particularly to overcome the intention%behaviour gap (see also Boss ’s [2015] 
commentary on PMT studies and Crossler ’s [2013] agenda for future behavioural 
information security research). 
 
#




The aim of our study was to evaluate the usefulness of PMT and RAA in explaining 
precautionary online behaviour. PMT and RAA both show good explanatory power, which 
indicates that both seem valuable in explaining this kind of behaviour. A main contribution of 
the combined model is that it shows that the individual predictors of the two constituent 
models (PMT and RAA) remain significant, thereby potentially providing practitioners more 
opportunities for prevention to increase people’s precautionary behaviour. Significant 
predictors should, for example, be emphasized in prevention campaigns in an effort to achieve 
Page 11 of 26 Information and Computer Security
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Inform
ation and Com
puter Security
 
 
behavioural change. Increased precautionary behaviour of end%users is beneficial for banks, as 
it might reduce the number of online banking fraud incidents. 
Considering predictor variables of PMT, response efficacy and self%efficacy are most 
important. This means that the more effective a measure is perceived and the better the ability 
of carrying out a measure is perceived, the more likely precautionary behaviour is, which 
concurs with previous studies (Crossler, 2010; Ifinedo, 2012; Lee, 2011; Liang and Xue, 
2010; Workman  2008). In contrast to Sommestad ’s (2015) findings, our results 
show that coping response (from PMT) is significant in explaining variance. Attitude, from 
RAA, can also be considered a primary predictor variable. The more positive the attitude 
towards precautionary online behaviour, the more likely such behaviour is, which is also 
demonstrated in earlier studies (Anderson and Agarwal, 2010; Fishbein and Ajzen, 2010; 
Venkatesh  2003). Scholars and practitioners should acknowledge these primary 
variables when developing prevention campaigns. 
Secondary determinants of explaining precautionary online behaviour, which behave 
in accordance with literature, are perceived severity (Chenoweth  2009; Gurung  
2009; Lee, 2011; Vance  2012; Workman  2008) and locus of control (Ifinedo, 
2014; Workman  2008). If end%users evaluate the impact of a threat as high and believe 
that threat prevention is something they are in control of (internal locus of control), the more 
likely they will adopt a recommended coping measure. Therefore, these variables should also 
be considered when implementing prevention strategies. Moreover, underscoring personal 
responsibility is found to be an important aspect in stimulating protection motivation 
(Boehmer  2015; Shillair  2015). 
The final two constructs that were significant predictors of protection motivation are 
the negative predictor response costs and the positive predictor descriptive norms. Both are in 
the proposed direction as was expected based on literature (Chenoweth  2009; Herath 
and Rao, 2009; Lee, 2011; Liang and Xue, 2010; Vance  2012). This means that when 
end%users consider the costs of a measure not outweighing its benefits and believe that others 
are taking precautions, they are likely to (also) perform precautionary online behaviour. The 
former is important for banks, meaning that they should find a favourable balance between 
the usability of their services and the tangible and intangible costs of precautionary measures. 
The latter could, for example, be achieved by showing in prevention campaigns how others 
are taking precautionary measures. 
Perceived vulnerability had no significant effect on protection motivation. Earlier 
studies found mixed results for this construct. Gurung  (2009) and Vance  (2012) 
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also reported a non%significant relationship. However, Chenoweth  (2009), Lee (2011) 
and Workman  (2008) found a positive relationship between perceived vulnerability and 
protection motivation. Crossler’s (2010) study on the other hand revealed a negative 
relationship. He explains that different outcomes can be attributed to the specific threats and 
behaviours studied and that future research is necessary to determine its true relationship. 
Injunctive norms were non%significant as well, contradicting earlier studies (Herath 
and Rao, 2009; Ifinedo, 2012, 2014). However, contrary to our study, these studies took place 
in organizations, while security of online banking may be seen as an individual rather than a 
social issue. It is probably not a subject that is often addressed in social conversations. 
Although there seems to be overlap between the models, it is important to stress that 
theory is advanced by testing the usefulness of these theories in the study of online 
behaviours. However, considering the advancement of theory, Ogden (2003) argues that this 
is problematic due to the unspecific nature of the constructs involved. Indeed, though the 
scales we used and the relationships we found were predetermined based on theory, the 
questionnaire items needed to be specified to the online domain in general and specifically to 
the online banking context. Another problem Ogden (2003) identifies is that social cognitive 
models often rely on analytic truths instead of synthetic truths. Qualitative exploratory 
research is recommended in order to identify predictor variables that are accountable for the 
variance we were not able to explain. 
For now, it seems that the integrated model is most effective in explaining variance. 
This conclusion is consistent with the work of Herath and Rao (2009) and Ifinedo (2012). 
However, as explained by Lippke and Ziegelmann (2008), one theory can be more suitable for 
explaining a specific behaviour across populations and another for explaining diverse 
behaviours in a specific population. It is uncertain to what extent the results are generalizable 
to other countries, since different countries have different payment cultures. For example, the 
uptake of online banking is high in the Netherlands and Nordic countries as compared to other 
European countries (Eurostat, 2016). Additionally, other cultural differences, such as 
uncertainty avoidance and power distance – both within and between countries – could have 
an influence on precautionary online behaviour (Crossler  2013), as well as the political 
and economic situation of a country (Aldás%Manzano  2009), for example on risk 
perceptions. Future research is needed – across different domains, behaviours and populations 
– to advance our knowledge in behavioural information security and to understand which of 
these (or competing) models best explains precautionary online behaviour of end%users. 
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In conclusion, our recommendations for enhancing precautionary online behaviour 
should be tested in practice. A fruitful way forward might be using experimental 
manipulations of PMT and RAA variables, as recommended by Shillair  (2015), in order 
to find the most promising strategies for this. To our knowledge, studies that investigate the 
power of either model’s predictors to create preventative measures are lacking. Additionally, 
future studies could benefit from including measuring fear and using fear appeal 
manipulations in order to enhance such strategies (Boss  2015). Furthermore, it is 
important to find out how and how often end%users should be presented with such 
information, in order to most effectively promote precautionary online behaviour. 
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